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n light of increasing investor interest in multifactor solutions, product providers have recently been debating the respective merits of the "top-down" and "bottom-up" approaches to multifactor portfolio construction. Top-down approaches assemble multifactor portfolios by combining distinct sleeves for each factor, whereas bottom-up methods build multifactor portfolios in a single pass by choosing and/or weighting securities by a composite measure of multifactor exposures.
Top-down multifactor portfolios blend single-factor portfolios with the aim of drawing on differentiated sources of returns while reducing the conditionality of performance. The top-down approach is simple and transparent and affords f lexible factorby-factor control of multifactor allocation, which makes it possible to serve diverse needs through different combinations of the same building blocks-and, more importantly, it allows for dynamic strategies. Its tractability and granularity also facilitate performance analysis, attribution, and reporting. Being typically assembled from reasonably diversified factor sleeves, top-down multifactor portfolios tend to produce portfolios with large effective numbers of stocks and, thus, good diversification of idiosyncratic risk.
In contrast, bottom-up portfolio construction has been favored by practitioners seeking to concentrate portfolios to offer higher scores across targeted factors, with the aim of reaping the higher rewards expected from higher exposures. Indeed, under reasonable assumptions about mapping factor scores by securities, the direct selection and/ or weighting of securities based on their characteristics across the targeted factors will result in higher factor scores than the combination of specialized sleeves can achieve (with the difference in potential scores increasing with the targeted concentration of the portfolio and the number of factors targeted and decreasing with factor correlations). Although this is a general problem, the superiority of bottom-up over top-down approaches for the achievement of high scores across multiple factors is typically illustrated by examples involving a pair of factors with low correlation, such as valuation and momentum. Mixing stand-alone portfolios targeting a high score for one factor in isolation leads to holding securities with low or negative scores with respect to the other targeted tilt. These securities that cause accelerated dilution of the scores of targeted tilts within the total portfolio can be avoided altogether when the two-factor portfolio is built directly by choosing securities that score highly with respect to each factor or on average across the two factors.
Proponents of bottom-up approaches argue that their higher factor exposures produce additional performance that makes it worthwhile for most investors to forsake the simplicity, transparency, and f lexibility of top-down approaches. However, although studies of bottom-up approaches such as the one by Bender and Wang [2016] document increased long-term returns, they typically fail to discuss short-term risks and implementation issues such as heightened turnover.
Against this backdrop, we have two objectives in this article. Our first objective is to (1) assess scoreweighted bottom-up approaches to determine whether applying concentrated weighting schemes to broad and narrow multifactor selections to increase portfolio factor scores can add to performance and (2) determine whether the fine-grain distinctions that some providers (FTSE Russell [2016] ) make between arithmetic and geometric averaging for composite score computation matter.
We find no evidence that geometric averaging is superior to arithmetic averaging. Consistent with the observations of in the context of single-factor selections, we document that naively deconcentrating multifactor selections through equal weighting yields higher risk-adjusted returns than score weighting. Unsurprisingly, it does not pay off to forego what has been described as "the only free lunch in investing." In multifactor investing, diversification of nonrewarded risk is as relevant as anywhere else, and score weighting is not only an inefficient way to harvest long-term factor premia but also exposes investors to sizeable absolute and relative extreme risks. Naively diversifying the unrewarded risk present in multifactor selections trumps increasing exposure to rewarded risks by concentrating these selections on the basis of security-level scores. We also find that the higher multifactor scores achieved by score weighting come with more instability in individual factor exposures and overall intensity.
Our second objective is to show how the smart beta index construction framework of Amenc and Goltz [2013] and the smart factor indices introduced in Amenc et al. [2014] can be seamlessly adapted to integrate the consideration of security-level cross-factor interactions. This framework is applied to the design of indices that can serve as building blocks for top-down multifactor portfolios yielding higher exposures across targeted factors. We then compare various multifactor portfolios built with these diversified high factor exposure smart factor indices to score-weighted bottom-up approaches.
To provide an acid test, we target a six-factor portfolio and compare the top-down approaches against the bottom-up strategies that were found to produce the highest performance.
Our results show that filtering securities with poor multifactor scores out of single-factor selections significantly increases the composite factor scores, absolute performance, and Sharpe ratios of top-down approaches based on smart factor indices without compromising diversification of unrewarded risks. Compared to the highest performing bottom-up strategies identified, these top-down approaches post comparable absolute performances but superior relative performances, produce higher returns per unit of factor intensity, and enjoy considerably lower turnover. All in all, our results suggest that the long-term performance benefits found in back tests of score-weighted approaches come at a significant cost in terms of efficiency, short-term risks, and implementation costs. Meanwhile, modifying smart factor index selections to take cross-factor exposures into consideration allows exposures to be improved while preserving the transparency, f lexibility, and efficiency of the top-down approach.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First, we review conceptual issues with multifactor portfolio construction. We then compare stylized portfolios employing composite factor scores in different ways, contrasting strategies with a score-weighting approach to those using a diversification-based weighting scheme. We then introduce a way to construct top-down indices while addressing interaction across multiple factors and contrast those strategies with concentrated scoreweighting approaches. The final section concludes.
ACADEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF FACTOR INVESTING
Although it is understandable that computational technicians have a tendency to aim at accounting for stock-level exposures to multiple factors with the highest possible precision, it is worth considering insights from finance. Empirical evidence on factor premia overwhelmingly suggests that the relations between factor exposures and expected returns, which have been validated for diversified test portfolios, do not hold with a high level of precision at the individual stock level. It should first be observed that factor scores are implicit return forecasts, which are notoriously difficult to make and inherently noisy at the stock level (see Merton [1980] ). In addition, there is ample direct evidence suggesting that characteristics do not provide an exact and deterministic link for stock returns at the individual stock level (see e.g., Cederburg and O'Doherty [2015] ). Moreover, it has been shown that the dependence of expected returns of factor exposures is not necessarily monotonous (see Patton and Timmermann [2010] ).
Although differences arise between the "best" and "worst" stocks for a given factor exposure, differences in expected returns among intermediate groups, which arithmetically averaged composite scoring methods would tend to favor, are not as reliable. This again suggests that overexploiting information in factor exposure is not likely to improve performance. In addition, although there is ample evidence that portfolios sorted on a single characteristic are related to robust patterns in expected returns, such patterns may break down when incorporating many different exposures at the same time. In an article often cited to vindicate bottom-up approaches (as in Bender and Wang [2016] ), Asness [1997, p. 29] observes, "Value works, in general, but largely fails for firms with strong momentum. Momentum works, in general, but is particularly strong for expensive firms." As a result, "increasing both Momentum and Value simultaneously has a significantly weaker effect on stock returns than the average of the marginal effects of increasing them separately" (Asness [1997, p. 34] ). This weakening would particularly impact securities favored by geometric composite scoring methods.
A more drastic failure is discussed by Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan [2015] , who show that even though the low-volatility anomaly exists in the broad cross section of stocks, low-volatility stocks actually underperform when considering only stocks that rank well on a composite multifactor score that includes 11 variables. Building bottom-up portfolios based on multifactor composites aggregating scores for factors that have been justified independently with top-down diversified portfolios may thus lack relevance. In addition, the selection and weighting of factor metrics for multivariate composite scores create post hoc combination possibilities that exacerbate data-mining problems (see Novy-Marx [2016] and Harvey, Liu, and Zhu [2016] ).
Overall, the fact that the empirical finance literature provides convincing evidence of relationships between factor exposures and returns for diversified portfolios does not imply a deterministic link at the individual stock level. Therefore, engineering multifactor portfolios under the assumption of a deterministic dependence of returns on security-level multifactor scores may lead to exploiting information that ultimately is not reliable. In a nutshell, the academic literature on factor investing provides little support for attempts to identify multifactor scoring methods to concentrate in factor champions. Instead, it is concerned with documenting factor premia on the basis of stand-alone single-factor portfolios that aim at broad diversification and parsimonious construction to obtain results that are robust.
FACTOR INDEXING AND BOTTOM-UP APPROACH
This section provides tests of stylized portfolios that rely on stock-level weighting by composite factor scores. We first introduce the construction methodology of stylized portfolios, which ref lect different approaches in multifactor index construction.
We make an important distinction in types of weighting schemes between diversification-based weighting, which essentially ignores information on factor scores and targets diversification benefits instead, and score weighting, which completely ignores any diversification considerations but uses stock-specific factor exposure information to determine the weight of each stock. We test different levels of stock selection, maintaining respectively 50% and 20% of stocks in the universe, from which we select stocks by their factor exposure. We test the different strategies on U.S. long-term data. Exhibit 1 provides an overview of the construction principles.
The Importance of Diversification
Although high factor exposure has been linked to higher long-term portfolio returns, concentration is still often synonymous with poor diversification of idiosyncratic risk or even with taking high (ex ante) unrewarded risks, such as country or sector risks. analyze alternative construction methods for singlefactor indices. They review the conceptual reasons for maintaining diversification when tilting to factors and provide empirical evidence that diversification-based weighting dominates concentrated weighting schemes in factor-tilted indices.
Here, we conduct an analysis in the spirit of for multifactor portfolios. We construct portfolios using the same two breadths of stock selection as in ; selections are established by ranking stocks by their multifactor scores, which are either arithmetic (as in Bender and Wang [2016] ) or geometric averaging (as in FTSE Russell [2016] ) of single-factor scores. Note that single-factor scores have been normalized to lie between 0 and 1. We then either use equal weighting as a proxy for diversified weighting schemes or use score weighting, in which we multiply the market cap-weight by the score to attribute weights to the selected stocks and then renormalize weights so that they sum to one.
Exhibit 2 provides a summary of performance measures for these different multifactor portfolios. We can see a key aspect of the results by comparing the performance and investability issues of scoreweighted portfolios (SCW) with those of the simple equal-weighted portfolios (EW). The two approaches, score weighting and equal weighting, ref lect very different investment philosophies. Score weighting ultimately means that one tries to exploit differences in factor scores at the stock level in addition to relying on the broad distinctions introduced at the stock-selection stage. By construction, equal weighting disregards stocklevel information and delivers deconcentration of the stock selection. Even compared to the naively diversified equal-weighting scheme, further exploiting information on stock-level scores for weighting clearly degrades relative performance (information ratio) and does not lead to clear improvements in absolute performance (Sharpe ratio).
Irrespective of both the level of stock selection and the type of composite measure (geometric or arithmetic), score weighting does not deliver any clear benefits in terms of average returns or Sharpe ratio over equal weighting, and it is clearly dominated by equal weighting in terms of information ratio. Equal weighting also leads to lower (extreme) tracking error and lower levels of extreme underperformance. For example, the extreme annualized tracking error observed for the narrow stock selection and arithmetic scoring is 18.06% with score weighting, compared to 13.83% with equal weighting, ref lecting a 30% increase in extreme tracking error introduced through score weighting. Score weighting delivers unadjusted outperformance of 4.63% per annum compared to 4.37% for equal weighting-hardly a pronounced difference. Thus, the higher levels of relative risk brought in through score weighting are not sufficiently rewarded in terms of returns.
These results are not surprising because the lower risk levels ref lect what one would expect from maintaining a consideration for diversification. Likewise, the higher risk levels introduced by score weighting are not unexpected because exploiting stock-level information on differences in factor exposures to concentrate the portfolio, in addition to increasing factor exposures, is likely to bring in unrewarded risk.
It is also instructive to compare the portfolios across different breadths of stock selection. In fact, the portfolio with the highest information ratio (0.65) is the one that uses equal weighting in conjunction with a half-universe stock selection by arithmetic composite score. The concentrated portfolio using a quintile stock selection and score weighting based on the arithmetic composite displays an information ratio of only 0.53. In this case, the stronger tilt leads to reduced relative-riskadjusted performance. Such a result clearly questions the use of highly concentrated score-weighted portfolios for investors concerned with risk-adjusted relative returns.
E X H I B I T 1 Summary of Construction Methodologies
As in , these results can be easily explained by the fact that increasing concentration to strengthen the power of tilting ignores any risk consideration. If more powerful tilting increases returns but increases risk in the same proportion, there is nothing to be gained on a risk-adjusted basis. If risk increases at a faster rate than returns, risk-adjusted performance will decrease.
It should be noted that although concentrated bottom-up approaches may indeed lead to powerful factor tilts, all the results in Exhibit 2 suggest that such approaches lead to very powerful losses in certain market conditions. For example, with the arithmetic composite, the extreme relative returns observed over one-year rolling periods reach levels of −13.30% with score weighting applied to the quintile selection, whereas the level is less than −8.76% with equal weighting of the half-universe selection. The most concentrated approach thus leads to a 50% increase in extreme underperformance relative to the least concentrated one.
The apparent appeal of the argument that one should seek strong tilts can therefore be questioned on rather obvious grounds. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine an investor utility function that would depend on the strength of factor tilts. The relevant question is thus whether stronger factor tilts do lead to improvements in risk-adjusted performance. Our results, taken together with those of , suggest that more powerful tilts do not automatically improve performance.
The strong performance and risk-adjusted performance of equal-weighted portfolios suggests that accounting precisely for stock-level differences in factor exposures through score weighting yields lower potential benefits than a very simple approach-one that Price and Compustat. disregards these differences at the weighting stage and instead naively diversifies the portfolio by applying a deconcentration scheme.
E X H I B I T 2 Performance and Risk Measures, December 31, 1975-December 31, 2015
Notes: Figures are based on daily total returns in USD. "MFS" is the multifactor score. EDHEC Risk U.S. LTTR cap-weighted index is used as the benchmark. The risk-free rate is the return of the three-month U.S. Treasury bill. The probability of outperformance is the probability of obtaining positive excess returns from investing in the strategy for a period of three years at any point during the history of the strategy. A rolling window of three years and a step size of one week is used. The maximum relative loss is calculated as the maximum loss suffered by a portfolio (which is long the strategy index and short the cap-weighted benchmark index) during a period relative to this portfolio's value at the beginning of the period. Sources: Center for Research in Security
To shed some light on the observed results in terms of performance, we analyze measures related to diversification benefits for the portfolios shown, similar to those used in . It should also be noted that our discussion thus far has completely ignored implementation issues, which are obviously an issue of first-order importance for smart beta investing. Therefore, we assess investability metrics as well.
Inspection of Exhibit 3 suggests that the results from increasing concentration are only strengthened when considering investability. Turnover is lower when the deconcentration weighting scheme is used, and considerably so in the case of the arithmetic average. All in all, the total performance and Sharpe ratio of score weighting is similar at best to equal weighting, but score weighting reliably reduces information ratios and increases turnover.
It is also interesting to inspect the diversification properties of the different portfolios. We observe that score weighting leads to a low number of effective stocks, implying a high level of concentration. Score weighting also displays high concentration when using the GLR metric of Goetzmann, Li, and Rouwenhorst [2005] which accounts for correlations across stocks. Together, these measures suggest that score-weighted portfolios end up being concentrated in a few highly correlated stocks. Increasing factor exposure by score weighting leads to poorly diversified portfolios.
Exhibit 3 also provides several measures of diversification benefits that adjust for the effect of factor exposures. To strip out the systematic component of portfolio risk, we use a multifactor regression model that includes the market factor, along with the six factors used in the portfolio tilts. Following Amenc et al. [2016a] , we then report standard deviation of the residual returns, which is the residual risk, and the unexplained return per unit of residual standard deviation (termed residual Sharpe ratio). The use of such a multifactor model captures any additional factor exposures introduced by diversification weighting compared to cap-weighting-for example, the size tilt.
We then compare residual performance and risk statistics across equal-weighted and score-weighted portfolios. Another way to quantify the risk reduction achieved by diversification is to compare the volatility of the portfolio to the volatility of its factor benchmark, which has been leveraged to match the returns of the factor-tilted portfolio. The factor benchmark is a synthetic portfolio with the same multifactor betas as the factor-tilted portfolio. Because the magnitude of systematic risk is identical for the portfolio and its factor benchmark, the difference in volatility for the same level of returns can only be explained by diversification, or in other words by the reduction of idiosyncratic risk. This volatility reduction is reported as an additional measure of diversification benefits.
These results indicate that the deconcentrated portfolios achieve large reductions in volatility relative to their multifactor benchmarks and high levels of idiosyncratic risk-adjusted return (residual Sharpe ratio). Thus, in addition to tilting to factors, these proxies for well-diversified multifactor portfolios also produce strong diversification benefits. Reducing unrewarded risks through diversification appears to offer a higher payoff than increasing exposure to long-term rewarded factors without regard for diversification, as done with score weighting.
On the other side, diversified portfolios tend to have lower capacity than concentrated portfolios anchored by capitalization weighting. However, liquidity rules can be applied to diversification schemes to improve their capacity without giving up the performance benefits, as documented in and Esakia et al. [2017] .
Notwithstanding this, the initial motivation, particularly behind concentrated score-weighted approaches, is to increase factor exposures. It is thus relevant to analyze the exposures resulting from the different approaches.
1 Exhibit 4 provides results for these exposures, but also looks at the imbalance across factors and the factor intensity-that is, the sum of exposures.
The results in Exhibit 4 conf irm that score weighting increases factor intensity relative to equally weighting the selected stocks. However, a striking result is that there is no clear relationship between the factor intensities in Exhibit 4 and the risk-adjusted performance in Exhibit 2. High factor intensity in itself does not translate into high risk-adjusted performance. Sharpe ratios are not supportive of a superiority of score weighting and information ratios point in the other direction, as does the analysis of short-term risks.
It is instructive to consider the expected excess return per unit of factor intensity. The results in Exhibit 4 show that score weighting leads to higher intensity but also to lower expected excess return per unit of factor intensity compared to equal weighting. This finding is consistent for geometric and arithmetic averaging and is observed at both levels of stock selection. The lower expected excess returns per unit of factor intensity of score-weighted portfolios suggest that score weighting delivers its factor intensity in an inefficient way. To further assess this efficiency issue, we construct levered portfolios with the objective of obtaining the same factor intensity as the score-weighted portfolio with the highest intensity (the one using a geometric average composite score and 20% stock selection, i.e., 1.08). These portfolios mix a leveraged position in the relevant strategy with a short position in the cap-weighted reference index to obtain the target intensity. This analysis relies on similar arguments as other performance metrics, such as the Graham and Harvey [1996] measures, that compare leveraged portfolios to match specific properties in order to allow for a comparison on equal grounds.
The results suggest that diversified portfolios have higher Sharpe ratios when adjusted to have the same level of factor intensity. Thus, better-diversified weighting schemes deliver factor premia in a more efficient way. This finding is not surprising as maximizing exposure by loading on stocks with high exposure has been found to be inefficient in other contexts. In fact, loading on high factor intensity stocks to obtain high factor intensity is reminiscent of loading on high market beta stocks to obtain high market beta. It is well known that leveraging up a well-diversified portfolio with a market beta of one to obtain a higher target market beta is superior to loading on high-beta stocks to obtain the same target beta. Loading on factor champions to obtain high factor intensity is similarly inefficient.
Because of the unrewarded risks that these strategies bring in (as documented in Exhibit 3), they do not make for a strong investment case. This confirms that a sole focus on factor intensity is misguided. Whether one achieves high factor intensity is neither here nor there. However, respecting the key insight from financial theory-that diversification matters-is indeed important.
It thus seems surprising that industry approaches have recently placed emphasis on factor intensity. Indeed, a naive attempt to increase factor intensity may be justified from a mechanical engineering perspective in which one tries to tweak calculations to obtain a high value for some metric; however, it is entirely inconsistent with financial concepts, which have clearly established the importance of diversification while not providing any rationale for focusing solely on factor intensity. Indeed, it may be worthwhile to ask how relevant the metric is before engineering portfolios that focus solely on it. It is perhaps reasonable to argue that pension fund trustees and members will care about risk-adjusted performance and ease of implementation, while it is safe to assume that they will be rather indifferent to whether their portfolios achieve powerful factor intensity.
Although we have focused so far on the long-term results, short-term results are an additional consideration. We provide results showing short-term factor measures in Exhibit 4. To assess the drift of factor scores over the short term, we compute factor drift similar to the style drift score measure of Idzorek and Bertsch [2004] . The factor drift ref lects the variation in factor betas over time.
Among the stylized portfolios, we observe that factor drift for narrow portfolios is more pronounced than for the portfolios with broader stock selections. Moreover, score weighting, which increases dependence on noisy security-level information, leads to higher factor drift than equal weighting. Overall, these findings suggest that while more concentrated bottomup portfolios achieve higher factor intensity, they also incur higher drift in factor exposure, thus exposing investors to the instability of the effectively delivered tilts. The high average factor intensities measured for the long-term results come at the cost of heightened instability in both exposures to individual factors and overall intensity.
To shed more light on the instability of factor exposures diagnosed in a tentative fashion, we provide further assessment of the instability of concentrated portfolios and the underlying factor scores in the next subsection.
Instability of Factor Scores
As emphasized in Amenc et al. [2012] , it is dangerous to allow smart beta strategies to take risk exposures without explicit control. What was true in the case of diversification schemes that could produce by-product exposures to factors is also relevant in the case of bottom-up approaches that let security-level characteristics precisely determine weights and create instability for the factor exposures at the portfolio level; this is because security-level noise already present in the selection stage of index construction is amplified by the weighting scheme. Exhibit 5 shows the correlation of multifactor scores measured annually at the time when all securities are rescored across all scores.
The relatively modest levels of autocorrelation of multifactor scores suggest that selections based on backward-looking scores may have a hard time delivering the same intensity in the post-formation period; lack of persistence in scores could be especially disruptive for bottom-up approaches that rely heavily on these scores for concentrating portfolios.
In addition to the lack of stability of the aggregate scores, it is potentially insightful to assess the persistence of the individual scores. Exhibit 6 shows the standard deviation of the exposures to individual factors of the different multifactor portfolios. The results suggest that the higher instability of exposures in concentrated score-weighted portfolios is not driven by a particular factor, but that instability typically increases with score weighting, relative to equal weighting.
Given the diagnosed issue with instability, we may also provide an explanation for the sometimes severe levels of turnover reported for the concentrated scoreweighted portfolios. To shed more light on the issue, we analyze the levels of turnover in stock selections of factor champions. When narrowing selection to the top decile in terms of multifactor score, we obtain levels of annual turnover for capitalization-weighted portfolios averaging 90% for the uppermost 10% of multifactor scores, and the 100% mark is crossed if we focus on the uppermost 5% of multifactor scores. Naturally, the turnover caused by this instability at the selection level is magnified by weighting schemes that are functions of these scores, whereas equal weighting of selection securities only incurs turnover from score changes that are significant enough to alter the composition of selections. By preventing fine distinctions in factor scores from affecting the weights of selection securities, deconcentration weighting avoids a powerful source of additional turnover.
Overall, it thus appears that a key source of the inferiority of concentrated score-weighting approaches, as compared to well-diversified factor-tilted portfolios, is that they rely too much on information that is unstable and ultimately not helpful in generating returns, while introducing unrewarded risks and implementation challenges.
RECONCILING DIVERSIFICATION AND FACTOR EXPOSURE OBJECTIVES IN A TOP-DOWN FRAMEWORK
Smart Factor Indices
The smart beta 2.0 index construction approach (Amenc and Goltz [2013] ) distinguishes two steps in the construction of smart beta strategies: The first step tilts toward the targeted risks by using transparent security selection, and the second step diversifies away the undesired and unrewarded risks by applying a diversification-weighting scheme. Amenc et al. [2014] use this approach to construct individual smart factor indices tilting toward documented factors and to assemble topdown multifactor portfolios.
A basic smart factor index is constructed by making a (broad) stock selection based on a single consensual metric related to the targeted factor (such as the book-to-market ratio for value versus growth selections) and then applying a deconcentration-or diversification-weighting scheme to the selection. The approach reconciles factor investing with diversification and deals with each in separate steps. The stock selection provides a broad distinction between stocks that rank well and stocks that rank poorly on a characteristic, while making only broad distinctions among groups of stocks to avoid picking up stock-level noise. Selected stocks are then weighted by schemes targeting diversification, whether through naive deconcentration, scientific diversification, or generally accepted risk-diversification approaches (such as risk parity).
Applying a portfolio of such weighting schemes averages the biases introduced by each scheme and reduces idiosyncratic model risk; in this context, the diversified multistrategy weighting scheme introduced in Amenc et al. [2014] equally weights five weighting schemes to achieve idiosyncratic risk reduction at both the firmlevel and the weighting-scheme level. Alternatively, the simplest weighting scheme is maximum deconcentration, which aims to maximize the effective number of stocks and coincides with equal weighting in the absence of constraints naturally, this scheme involves renouncing the potential for improving the index risk-adjusted return by exploiting security-level risk parameters.
Once smart factor indices for different targeted factors have been put together, it is straightforward to implement any multifactor allocation by blending these indices. The modularity of this approach allows for dynamic multifactor allocation through transparent adjustments of single smart factor index weights within the portfolio; this can be used to incorporate tactical views and, more importantly, for risk management, including the control of risk factor exposures. Transparency and
E X H I B I T 6 Standard Deviation of Factor Exposures, December 31, 1975-December 31, 2015
Notes: Based on weekly total returns in USD. "MFS" is the multifactor score. Three-year rolling window with one-week step size is used.
tractability of multifactor allocations also facilitate risk and performance analysis and reporting. It should be noted that objectives in terms of factor exposure, such as increasing intensity, can also be addressed through allocation decisions across factor indices. A key benefit of the latter approach, which we test in this article, is that it employs well-diversified subportfolios to increase factor exposure rather than bottom-up concentration based on noisy stock-level information.
A Method to Address Interaction across Factors in a Top-Down Index Construction Framework
Whichever methodologies are used, the bottomup approach is based on the idea of selecting factor champions-that is, stocks with the highest multifactor scores. However, in a long-only context, it may be less important to identify factor champions than to avoid factor losers. Exhibit 7 compares the long-only cap-weighted portfolios consisting of either the top 5% and 10% champion stocks or the loser stocks based on the multifactor score, which is either the geometric or the arithmetic mean of the six normalized individual factor rank scores.
The absolute value of underperformance for the factor loser portfolios is greater than the outperformance of the factor champion portfolios. For example, the relative return of the portfolio with the top 5% stocks selected based on the geometric mean multifactor score is 4.42%, whereas the relative return of the corresponding portfolio with the 5% loser multifactor stocks is −8.96%. Hence, the elimination of stocks with poor multifactor scores from long-only portfolios may prove more powerful than the concentration in factor champions, and interestingly, it can be accommodated by a top-down approach.
We test an elimination of stocks with the lowest multifactor scores within each of six single-factor stock selections prior to applying the diversification-weighting schemes. The objective is to obtain smart factor indices with higher factor exposures in multifactor combinations, and we thus term these filtered indices "diversified high factor exposure smart factor indices."
The multifactor metric chosen is the arithmetic average of the normalized rank scores for five of the six targeted factors (valuation, momentum, volatility, investment, and probability); the size factor is omitted because any diversification-weighting scheme induces a tilt away from the largest capitalizations that is not diluted by blending smart factor indices targeting different factors.
Thus, in addition to achieving the desired factor tilt by way of the initial selection, diversified high factor exposure smart factor indices will also have aggregate exposure to the other rewarded factors that will be higher than that of their unfiltered counterparts. This will mitigate dilution when indices targeting different factors are blended. We now turn to comparing the scoreweighted bottom-up approaches assessed previously to top-down multifactor portfolios formed by assembling unfiltered and diversified high factor exposure smart factor indices, respectively.
Comparing Bottom-Up and Top-Down Approaches
In these comparisons, we benchmark different top-down multifactor strategies against the concentrated E X H I B I T 7 bottom-up approaches-that is, the score-weighted approaches applied to quintile selections. The smart factor indices used as building blocks in the top-down strategies are based on broad selections (half universe), as in Amenc et al. [2014] . For the diversified high factor exposure indices, selections are shrunken to 30% of the total number of stocks in the universe. Four top-down portfolios are evaluated: (1) the unfiltered multibeta, multistrategy six-factor index (equal-weighted); (2) its high factor exposure counterpart; (3) the multibeta, maximum deconcentration diversif ied high factor exposure six-factor index (equal-weighted); and (4) the multibeta, multistrategy diversified maximum factor exposure index-a solution approach that dynamically allocates to individual diversified, high factor exposure smart factor indices to maximize the portfolio's geometric average exposure to the targeted factors. The data on these indices are sourced from the ERI Scientific Beta website, which also provides detailed methodologies.
Unlike the bottom-up approaches reviewed, topdown strategies do not have the maximization of average factor exposure at their core, but instead blend diversified portfolios that aim to provide exposure to different sources of factor risks; the maximization objective is present only at the allocation stage of the diversified maximum factor exposure index. Even in this case, the search for higher factor intensity is performed in a framework of reasonable allocations to indices, which are themselves well diversified-thus avoiding stock-level concentration.
Whereas score-weighted bottom-up approaches exploit stock-level information to increase factor intensity, maximum deconcentration indices disregard security-level information altogether; and the other diversification schemes used for multistrategy indices only use robust risk parameters, while being subjected to diversification adjustments or constraints to avoid the well-documented pitfalls of picking up and amplifying stock-level noise in portfolio construction.
In the context of the top-down portfolios reviewed here, factor exposures are thus used primarily to select broad groups of stocks and, in the context of the diversified maximum factor exposure index, to make allocation decisions across broad stock groups.
Long-term performance and risk measures reported in Exhibit 8 show that all strategies deliver pronounced excess returns and improved Sharpe ratios over the cap-weighted index. They also reveal that the top-down strategies implemented with the diversified high factor exposure smart factor indices cancel half of the performance differential between the unfiltered topdown strategy and the narrow-selection score-weighted indices chosen for this acid test. On a total-risk-adjusted basis, the multibeta, multistrategy diversified high factor exposure index and diversified max exposure are arguably in the same class as the score-weighted approaches; however, top-down approaches have higher relativerisk-adjusted performance.
The concentration of the bottom-up approaches contributes to high tracking error resulting in lower information ratios (0.53 and 0.49 for arithmetic and geometric averaging, respectively) than top-down approaches. Tracking error is also found to increase with concentration for top-down approaches, with the standard multibeta, multistrategy index boasting the lowest tracking error (4.39%) and the highest information ratio (0.65). The top-down approach that allows for the highest concentration to maximize the composite factor score at the portfolio level exhibits the highest tracking error and the lowest information ratio of the top-down approaches.
The diversified maximum factor exposure index still compares positively to the bottom-up approaches in this regard, illustrating that it retains the diversification benefits that the score-weighted approaches fail to exploit. Differences are more pronounced when we look at the extreme relative returns and extreme tracking error. Top-down approaches have significantly lower extreme tracking error than bottom-up approaches (10.59% versus 17.43% on average, i.e., an improvement of almost 40%). Similarly, top-down approaches have less punishing extreme relative returns (−8.29% vs. −13.44% on average, an improvement approaching 40%). Hence, the superior long-term performance documented for the narrow-selection score-weighted approaches comes with significant short-term risks.
The results in Exhibit 9 highlight some of the concentration and investability issues of the bottomup approaches. Because stock-level factor scores change over time, weighting schemes that rely on stock-level scores lead to high turnover compared to strategies that do not overemphasize these stock-level characteristics (as documented in Exhibit 3). The more concentrated the portfolio, the higher the impact of score instability on turnover.
In this regard, the effective numbers of stocks of the bottom-up approaches reported in Exhibit 9 are consistent with the application of concentrating weighting schemes to a narrow selection, and the high levels of turnover observed are then unsurprising given the limited persistence of composite scores illustrated by Exhibit 5. Unsurprisingly, the top-down portfolios have effective numbers of constituents, which are consistent with the use of broad stock selections and diversifying weighting schemes at the building block level and the blending of multiple factor sleeves. The same contribute to their lower turnovers. In the case of the indices implementing equal allocation to the six-factor sleeves, the cancellation of cross trades across sleeves more than offsets the turnover required to periodically reset the allocation.
The effective number of stocks is a measure of concentration and if we wish to assess diversification, the Goetzmann-Li-Rouwenhorst (GLR) measure is one possible tool. Although the volatility of the bottomup portfolios is close to 20% lower than that of the capitalization-weighting index of the universe, their GLR measures are comparable, which suggests that the lower volatility of these multifactor approaches is not achieved by better diversification of idiosyncratic risk, but instead primarily by concentration in securities that offer lower total volatility (which heightens conditionality risk).
The high level of the GLR measure is not surprising because the potential for diversification of a selection of securities is inversely related to their correlations; and it is reasonable to expect that factor champions should show higher correlations to one another than average securities-especially since score-weighted methods make no attempt at exploiting this potential. The GLR measures of the top-down portfolios are significantly better than those of the bottom-up portfolios, whereas their total volatilities are similar or higher, which suggests better diversification of idiosyncratic risk. standard deviations of residuals and the superior residual Sharpe ratios displayed by the top-down approaches are also consistent with high diversification.
The figures in Exhibit 10 on long-term factor exposures confirm that the use of diversified high factor exposure smart factor indices delivers top-down multifactor portfolios with significantly increased factor exposures; unsurprisingly, the diversified max factor exposure index achieves the highest factor intensity with an increase of close to 50% relative to the unfiltered multibeta, multistrategy index. Just as unsurprisingly, the bottom-up strategies produce the highest exposures.
However, top-down approaches deliver higher excess returns per unit of factor intensity-on average, circa 25% more than bottom-up strategies. The Sharpe ratios of portfolios that have been levered to achieve the highest factor intensity delivered by the bottomup approaches are consistently higher for top-down strategies. These results clearly suggest that relative to multifactor top-down approaches, score-weighted strategies deliver their higher factor intensities in an inefficient way.
Exhibit 10 also assesses the instability of factor exposures. It is worth pointing out that the bottom-up approach that produces the highest factor intensity also suffers the highest absolute and relative instability of this intensity. The intensity drift is twice as high as for the top-down approaches built with diversified high factor exposure indices and is close to 30% higher per unit of factor intensity delivered.
CONCLUSION
A main objective of this article is to compare bottom-up methodologies that rely on multifactor score weighting to build concentrated portfolios to achieve higher composite exposure across targeted factors than less concentrated top-down multifactor approaches. As already observed in the context of single-factor portfolios ), the present study confirms that the engineering of high factor intensity through concentrating score-weighted schemes comes with significant drawbacks.
It appears that by ignoring the central tenet of modern portfolio theory to focus solely on increasing factor score intensity and by assuming strong relationships between security-level scores and performance, score-weighted approaches expose investors to risks that are unrelated to factors and for which no reward should be expected. Our results show that multifactor score-weighed portfolios increase factor intensity but fail to improve absolute performance compared to naively diversified multifactor-tilted portfolios-while significantly reducing relative performance. Score weighting reduces diversification, and the costs of increased exposure to unrewarded risks more than offset the benefits of increased factor scores. Performance per unit of factor intensity is markedly lower for score weighting than it is for equal weighting, highlighting the fact that score weighting is an inefficient approach to capturing factor premia. In addition, the higher factor exposures generated by score weighting multifactor selections exhibit less stability in composition and intensity than those produced by equal weighting. Last but not least, magnifying the impact of unstable security-level scores through weighting is found to increase turnover.
Against this backdrop, we adapt the topdown approach to the consideration of cross-factor interactions. We show how filtering multifactor losers out of single-factor portfolios significantly improves the composite factor scores, absolute performance, and riskadjusted performance of top-down approaches based on smart factor indices, without materially impacting their capacity to diversify away unrewarded risks. Top-down approaches implemented with these high-exposure smart factor indices post absolute performances that rival those of the highest-performing score-weighted strategies. However, their better diversification of unrewarded risks, attested by multiple measures, produces higher relative performance and considerably reduces extreme relative losses. Although they do not reach the high levels of factor intensity of bottom-up methods, they produce higher returns per unit of factor intensity and considerably lower turnover.
In addition, the granularity and modularity of this approach to constructing higher-exposure top-down multifactor portfolios allows for explicit risk management through dynamic allocation to well-diversified factor-tilted indices. In sharp contrast with scoreweighting strategies, which let unstable security-level characteristics determine the factor loadings of the portfolio and produce severe by-product exposure to unrewarded risks, dynamic allocation to diversified high factor exposure smart factor indices provides investors with efficient capture of, and control over, desired risk exposures-including factor risk exposures-in the context of their multifactor investment programs.
ENDNOTE
1 All the regressions in this article are based on weekly total returns data. The market factor is the excess return series of the cap-weighted index over the risk-free rate. Other factors are constructed from the return series of long/short portfolios formed by equally weighting stocks in the top/ bottom three deciles of ranks for each factor criterion.
